Focus on Comparison in Comparative Law, A by Junker, Kirk W.
Duquesne Law Review 
Volume 52 Number 1 Article 4 
2014 
Focus on Comparison in Comparative Law, A 
Kirk W. Junker 
Follow this and additional works at: https://dsc.duq.edu/dlr 
 Part of the Comparative and Foreign Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Kirk W. Junker, Focus on Comparison in Comparative Law, A, 52 Duq. L. Rev. 70 (2014). 
Available at: https://dsc.duq.edu/dlr/vol52/iss1/4 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Duquesne Scholarship Collection. It has been accepted 
for inclusion in Duquesne Law Review by an authorized editor of Duquesne Scholarship Collection. 
A Focus on Comparison in Comparative Law
Kirk W. Junker*
I. GLOBALIZATION-THE LATEST IN THE HISTORY OF
COMPARATIVE LAW EXIGENCIES .................... 70
A. A History of Law's Comparative Practices......... 70
B. The Comparative Law Orthodoxies of Method.. 76
C. Critiques of the Orthodoxies. ............... 82
II. RHETORIC AND LAW ....................... ........ 90
III. THE FOCUS ON COMPARISON APPLIED ............... 97
IV. CONCLUSION ..................................... 98
The common law was not developed in the university, but in the
inns of court, in the law offices of practitioners and in the court-
rooms of adversarial advocacy. As such, it was not developed as
an academic discipline. So which disciplines did form the founda-
tion of the formal education that lawyers had during the develop-
ment of the common law? The historical record will show that
lawyers in both the civil and common law traditions were being
taught the foundational training and practices of rhetoric. With
this general thesis in mind, one can consider rhetoric's topic of
comparison. In the ancient art of rhetoric, the common topoi (top-
ics) included relationship, circumstance, testimony, definition and
comparison. For this present article, I will focus only upon com-
parison. Definition, as it turns out, may well be a trend in the
way of seeing the world, just as atomism was a trend in the way of
seeing the world in the natural sciences before systems began to
be taken seriously as non-reducible to their parts; that is, as not
being atomic. Thus, a shift to comparative thinking and study in
the law and a shift away from definitional thinking in the law well
might be part of the Zeitgeist of globalization. The question to be
addressed is whether this is the time for comparativism.
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I. GLOBALIZATION-THE LATEST IN THE HISTORY OF COMPARATIVE
LAW EXIGENCIES
In many Western consumer industries--clothing, furniture, au-
tomobiles, electronics, and entertainment, for example-fashion is
determined by the whim of those who have the power to profit
from their ideas. Does that include intellectual fashion? Can it be
manipulated intentionally? Does intellectual fashion come about
as a response to a perceived crisis? Indeed it does. Globalism is
one such perceived crisis. To the profiteers of the market, global-
ism is expressed as a positive thing-more and bigger markets
and supply chains. But for those who are not in dominant cul-
tures, for those who either cannot or choose not to profit from their
ideas, globalism can be a threat. Is the study and practice of law a
market commodity or an expression of culture? During an era of
globalization, if a particular culture is not a dominant one, the
culture stands the risk of losing the features of its legal system
that are unique to the culture. Globalism is the latest exigency
that emphasizes the need to employ comparative law, and it mer-
its a focus upon comparison itself.
A. A History of Law's Comparative Practices
Where has the focus in comparative law been until now? Why
do we compare? Too often, foundational questions such as why
one compares and whether comparative law goals are really
achievable are ignored. Instead, we jump ahead immediately into
the method of how one compares or worse, just start making un-
methodical juxtapositions without asking why or how. Even be-
fore comparative law had a disciplinary status or a name, practi-
tioners of law looked outside their own systems. Already in the
eleventh and twelfth centuries, the historical record indicates
practices that we might today call "comparative." "[Tihe jurists
observed that in all the various legal systems under examination
the question arose whether one who was forcibly dispossessed of
his goods has the right to take them back by force."' The author of
the 1231 Liber Augustalis, a codification of the law of the Kingdom
of Sicily, was "moved by the spirit of scholasticism that informed
the intellectual life of the age to resolve differences within the ex-
isting legal tradition of the regno and to distill his legal knowledge
1. HAROLD BERMAN, LAW AND REVOLUTION: THE FORMATION OF THE WESTERN LEGAL
TRADITION 153 (Harvard University Press 1983) (emphasis added).
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and that of his associates, probably practical men of the courts,
into a unified body of law . . . .
But although the practice of comparison has been with us from
inside the law for some time, the practice is most often silent on
the nature and workings of the very act of comparison itself. For
example, my own informal survey of many well-known scholars
working today found that their institutions list their areas of re-
search as including comparative law, but a review of the titles
these scholars publish indicates little talk of comparison. Instead,
the titles seem to indicate that the scholar is active in at least one
foreign language and one or more foreign legal system that prac-
tices law in that language, but nowhere do these titles talk about
comparison per se. John Henry Merryman has noted that the
study of foreign law is what "most comparatists do in fact most of
the time."' Consequently the nature of the comparisons is done
uncritically, as though there is some "natural," one and right way
to do it. It would be more accurate and helpful to keep separate a
category of scholarship called "foreign law," in which persons
trained in one tradition and language serve the important func-
tion of reporting on other traditions and languages to persons for
whom the others are foreign.
There are other reasons why one might rightly distinguish the
study of foreign law from comparative law. In their canonical
treatment of comparative law, Konrad Zweigert and Hein K6tz
have agreed that the "mere study of foreign law falls short of being
comparative law."4 Unfortunately, the majority of literature fails
to heed that admonition. Perhaps the distinction is blurred be-
2. JAMES M. POWELL, THE LIBER AUGUSTALIS OR CONSTITUTIONS OF MELFI,
PROMULGATED BY THE EMPEROR FREDERICK II FOR THE KINGDOM OF SICILY IN 1231 xxi
(Syracuse University Press 1971), quoted in BERMAN, supra note 1, at 427. It is also worth
noting here that, as with the common law, the knowledge of "the practical men of the
courts" was part of the unified body of Sicilian law.
3. Mathias Reimann, The Progress and Failure of Comparative Law in the Second
Half of the Twentieth Century, 50 AM. J. COMP. L. 671, 675 n.18 (2002) (citing JOHN H.
MERRYMAN, THE LONELINESS OF A COMPARATIVE LAWYER 4 (1999)). In that same footnote,
Reimann notes that "Looking through the volumes of the American Journal of Comparative
Law, one quickly recognizes that almost invariably, the articles about foreign law outnum-
ber (often by a huge margin) those explicitly comparing two or more systems."
4. KONRAD ZWEIGERT & HEIN KOTZ, INTRODUCTION TO COMPARATIVE LAW 6 (Tony
Weir trans., 3d ed. 1998). Reimann notes that "Indeed, foreign legal studies
("Auslandsrechtskunde") would be a more precise term." Reimann, supra note 3, at 675
n.17 (citing MAX RHEINSTEIN, EINFOHRUNG IN DIE RECHTSVERGLEICHUNG 22 (2d ed. 1987)).
American literary critic Kenneth Burke said of his own work that he was most uncomforta-
ble when he disagreed with Aristotle. I should feel the same about disagreeing with Zwei-
gert and Kotz.
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cause anyone who is studying something that he would call "for-
eign" must be doing so while standing in his or her own legal sys-
tem. While an author of such a study may not explicitly talk of
comparison, he or she is of course comparing. When studying a
foreign legal system, we cannot avoid comparing it to our own, at
the very least. But it is important to become cognizant that we
are comparing. Successful comparative law study must bring
one's comparisons to consciousness and not act as though they are
fixed and non-negotiable. Even when the theme of a work does
not make its comparative thought explicit, evidence of an author's
comparative practices may be found in the preface, foreword and
other marginalia of his or her work.
Mathias Reimann notes that "outside of a small hard core, most
of those engaged in comparative work of one sort or another do not
even think of themselves (primarily) as comparative lawyers but
mainly as Asia specialists, Russian law scholars, constitutional
lawyers with comparative interests, etc."' And yet if these schol-
ars and lawyers are specializing in legal cultures other than their
own, they must be doing so by way of comparison with their own
legal culture.
As an aide to focus on the concept of comparison, one can begin
by looking at when and why comparative law came into being as a
separate discipline of its own. In reflecting upon such considera-
tions, comparativist Paul Koschaker persuasively concluded that
legal comparison is not possible, only comparative legal history is
possible.' A neatly-packaged history of the schools of thinking in
comparative law is not readily possible because there are not clean
breaks over time with any one "ism" (formalism or functionalism,
for example), and besides, most scholars do not reside neatly in
any one school. Nevertheless, some approximations in both histo-
ry and intellectual camps are helpful. Legal historian Frederick
G. Kempin asserts that "[1]egal history can dispel many commonly
held misconceptions. One is that the common law is held in the
iron bands of tradition through the doctrine of precedent. But
precedent is little more than comparing present cases with past
5. Giinter Frankenberg, Critical Comparisons: Re-thinking Comparative Law 26
HARV. INT'L L.J. 411, 443 (1985).
6. Reimann, supra note 3, at 687.
7. Paul Koschaker, Was vermag die vergleichende Rechtswissenschaft zur Indoger-
manenfrage beizusteuern? FS Hirt, Vol. 1, 145, 150 (Heidelberg, 1936), quoted in
BERNHARD GROSSFELD, CORE QUESTIONS OF COMPARATIVE LAW 239 (Vivian Grosswald
Curran trans., Carolina Academic Press 2004).
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cases."' Thus, Kempin goes so far as to say that the practice of
making and applying common law is in fact constituted by compar-
ison. But is the comparison practiced by a common law lawyer the
same as that practiced by a civil law lawyer?
To answer this question, it remains important to note that as a
discipline, comparative law cannot approach its topic from a neu-
tral or omnipresent position. At a minimum, common law lawyers
approach comparative law differently than civil lawyers do, be-
cause their point of departure differs. And here we learn that at
the great Paris Exposition in 1900, the International Congress for
Comparative Law introduced comparative law in the form in
which we know it today. The spirit of that age was "progress."
The goal of the Congress, as recorded by its reporter, Edouard
Lambert, was a droit commun de l'humanit6. (law common to all
of humanity). He went on to describe the noble goal that:
[Clomparative law must resolve the accidental and divisive
differences in the laws of peoples at similar stages of cultural
and economic development, and reduce the number of diver-
gences in law, attributable not to the political, moral, or social
qualities of the different nations, but to historical accident or
to temporary or contingent circumstances."9
So at the height of the world's love affair with industrial progress,
it was thought by Edouard Lambert and the others present at the
International Congress for Comparative Law that it was not only
possible to distill a world private legal system from comparing all
those existing already, but that it was desirable to do so.
In the century or so that comparative law has been researched
and practiced as such, its goals and theories have changed. The
optimism of that purpose eroded with the passage of time during
which a world system was not forthcoming, soured by the discord-
ance of two world wars and a lengthy cold war.'o Nevertheless,
8. FREDERICK G. KEMPIN, HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION TO ANGLO-AMERICAN LAW (3d
ed. West Publishing Company 1990).
9. ZWEIGERT & KOTZ, supra note 4, at 3. Note that the Congress sought a similar goal
in 1900 as the Liber Augustalis author sought in 1231-"to resolve differences."
10. Although it should be noted that as recently as 1989, physicist Werner Heisenberg
still wrote "If one looks around in history as to what great capacities human societies hold,
next to the primitive same-race feelings that are prevalent already in the animal kingdom,
is the shared language. But in addition to these strengths are two more still, which are
stronger and can bring together even peoples of different races and languages: a common
faith and, strongest of all, a common law." WERNER HEISENBERG, ORDNUNG UND
WIRKLICHKEIT, 152 (Piper Munich/Zurich 1989), cited in GROSSFELD, supra note 7, at 232.
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unperturbed by the First World War, French lawyer Pierre Le-
paulle, writing in the Harvard Law Review in 1922, claimed that
the war was evidence of an even greater need for comparative law
because "divergences in laws cause divergences that generate un-
consciously, bit by bit these misunderstandings and conflicts
among nations which end with blood and desolation."n One must
of course remain conscious of one's stated focus and goal in any
comparative law enterprise. For example, the European common
market, established by the legal acts of treaties, became a legal
reality in order to prevent a third world war. When Jos6 Manuel
Barroso, President of the European Commission, is asked with
every new "crisis" in the EU, whether the EU is successful, he an-
swers without hesitation that it is, and quickly continues to say
that Europe has not started another world war since the EU be-
gan. Perhaps a similar, though lesser claim could be made about
the United Nations. Both examples echo Lepaulle's point that
when cultures are in dialogue, through some institutionalized
means, they are less prone to war.
While avoiding war is a large and noble goal for comparative
law, there are other, more direct and personal goals for compara-
tive law as well. Lepaulle added:
If I may state a personal experience, I never completely un-
derstood French law before coming to the United States and
studying another system. History of law seems inadequate to
give the student this sense of relativity, because in history we
often deal with forces which are not yet dead, which still un-
consciously bend the mind of the student in a certain direc-
tion. To see things in a true light, we must see them from a
certain distance, as strangers, which is impossible when we
study any phenomena of our own country. This is why com-
parative law should be one of the necessary elements in the
training of all those who are to shape the law for
societies . . . .12
There are many other reasons why one might compare legal sys-
tems or legal families. Respected comparativists Ren6 David and
John E. C. Breierly summarize three reasons to compare as fol-
lows: "it is useful in historical and philosophical legal research; it
11. Pierre Lepaulle, The Function of Comparative Law With a Critique of Sociological
Jurisprudence, 35 HARv. L. REV. 838, 857 (1922).
12. Id. at 858.
74 Vol. 52
A Focus on Comparison
is important in order to understand better, and to improve, one's
national law; and it assists in the promotion of the understanding
of foreign peoples," thereby developing favorable contexts for in-
ternational relations.13
Gunter Frankenberg asserts that "The ultimate aims of com-
parative law [are]-to reform and improve the laws, to further
justice and to better the lot of humankind . . . ."" From his own
survey of the biggest names in the comparative law field-Ren6
David, Mary Ann Glendon, John Henry Merryman, Max Rhein-
stein, Rudolph B. Schlesinger, Konrad Zweigert and Hein Ktz-
Mathias Reimann summarizes the reasons to teach comparative
law from the authors of what one might consider to be the canon of
comparative law:
1. Foreign models may improve domestic law;
2. Comparative law practice promotes international unifica-
tion or at least harmonization;
3. Comparative law study and practice reveals the common
core of all law;
4. Comparative law study teaches the basic skills of interna-
tional legal practice;
5. The study of comparative law provides overview of law on a
world-wide scale by introducing the student to the major le-
gal families, or at least provides knowledge of foreign legal
families;
6. The study of foreign law familiarizes students with foreign
rules, concepts, and approaches and thereby facilitates com-
munication with foreign lawyers;
13. R. DAVID & J. BRIERLEY, MAJOR LEGAL SYSTEMS IN THE WORLD TODAY 4 (2d. ed.
1978), quoted in Frankenberg, supra note 5, at 418.
14. Frankenberg, supra note 5, at 412-13 (citing K. ZWEIGERT & H. KOTZ, supra note 4,
at 12-14,19-23; A. Tunc, La contribution possible des 9tudes juridiques comparatives a une
meilleure comprdhension entre nations, 16 REVUE INTERNATIONALE DE DROIT COMPARE'
[R.I.D.C.] 47 (1964); A. Tunc, Comparative Law, Peace and Justice, in XXTH CENTURY
COMPARATIVE AND CONFLICTS LAW 80 (A. Mehren & J. Hazard eds., 1961); Ferdinand F.
Stone, The End to be Served by Comparative Law, 25 TUL. L. REV. 325 (1951); Rend David,
The Study of Foreign, Law as a Contribution Towards International Understanding, 2 INT'L
SOC. SCIE. BULL. 5 (1950); Hessel E.Yntema, Comparative Law and Humanism, 7 Am. J.
COMP. L. 493 (1958)).
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7.By forcing students to compare foreign law with their own,
it forces them to be critical of their own system;
8. The study of comparative law helps students to understand
law as a general phenomenon, in particular its contingency on
history, society, politics, and economics; and
9.By providing critical perspectives and explaining alterna-
tives, the study and practice of comparative law fosters toler-
ance towards other legal cultures and thus overcomes paro-
chial attitudes.1 5
Using this brief historical survey of the reasons that scholars
have given for comparison, and after answering the question of
why we should compare, we further the process by asking how one
makes comparisons within the law (generally), then ask how one
compares specific legal phenomena, and then finally, ask what
conclusions are warranted from an exercise in comparison.
B. The Comparative Law Orthodoxies of Method
A study of the history of comparative law yields some trends in
method. And so the history of comparative law may be told as a
history of the orthodoxies of method, whether they were conscious-
ly or unconsciously employed. Regardless of the reason why one
compares parts or whole legal systems, one must proceed methodi-
cally in order to compare intelligently. As Paul Koschaker warned
in 1935, "bad comparative law is worse than none."" For example,
bad comparative law might simply look to compare texts (usually
in some language of translation, perhaps for both countries). Even
if the codes or procedural rules of two systems appear superficially
to be very similar, they will often provide an unreliable compari-
son: "For example, some aspects of Dutch procedures ... bear a
striking resemblance to recent proposals for new procedures in the
Scottish courts. Yet we can be certain that if the Scottish pro-
posals were to be implemented, the Scottish courts would still
work very differently from the Dutch courts."" To make useful
15. Mathias Reimann, The End of Comparative Law as an Autonomous Subject, 11
TUL. EUR. & Civ. L.F. 49,54 (1996).
16. Koschaker, supra note 7, at 149-50, quoted in GROSSFELD, supra note 7, at 14.
17. Judge David Edward in "Fact-Finding: A British Perspective," in 14 THE OPTION OF
LITIGATING IN EUROPE 44 (D.L. Carey Miller and Paul R. Beaumont eds., British Inst. Of
Intl and Comparative Law 1993), quoted in Jeremy Lever, Why Procedure is More Im-
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comparisons in the law, one must know more than the words of
texts.
However one arrives at the method of comparison that one em-
ploys, he or she must give serious consideration to the choice.
Why? To begin with, a student or practitioner outside a particu-
lar legal society cannot study law in the same way that a person
within that society would study its law. Learning language pro-
duces a good analogy here." We learn our native language by us-
age, and learn that usage in the context of its native spoken cul-
ture. We learn additional languages through the methodical me-
chanics of grammar and vocabulary, outside of the native cultural
context. Therefore, we should be wary of the mechanical artificial-
ities, out of context, when learning additional legal cultures and
making comparisons. Even the native who does not study the law
as a legal specialist has learned the values, norms and procedures
in that law, at some level, from everyday experience in his or her
culture. Some of the things a native of any culture learns about
his legal system might even be regarded by legal professionals as
being wrong, but if it is generally learned in that culture, it is a
force that forms general cultural expectations among the natives
and cannot be dismissed. Equally important is the fact that one
should not study a foreign society's law, out of cultural context, as
though it is just another substantive law course or practice area in
one's own system.
Weak comparisons, typical of colonization justifications, begin
with the assumption that what one already does is natural or
normal, and if another person or culture does things differently,
then that other person or culture is therefore unnatural or abnor-
mal. This seems to be more commonly accepted among non-
comparativists and even among those who are neither comparativ-
ists nor lawyers, such as the German television journalist who
telephoned me when Dominique Strauss-Kahn was arrested in
New York and demanded to know why "American" law allowed
Mr. Strauss-Kahn to be shown in handcuffs and allowed cameras
in the courtroom. Of course, in the journalist's own culture both
were prohibited, so to him the prohibition of either must be natu-
ral and normal. "The similarities that surface in the course of
such comparisons are mirror images of the categories of the con-
portant Than Substantive Law, 48 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 285, 301
(April 1999).
18. Infra we will see that language functions in an even greater role than as analogy.
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ception of law in the comparativist's own culture. Ambiguities are
defined away or adjusted to fit the model; thus the 'home' law is
positioned as natural, normal, standard . . . ."' Correcting for
one's native bias is one of the thorniest problems in comparative
law scholarship and practice. Can these biases be corrected simp-
ly be recognizing them? Perhaps. In criticizing the status quo of
comparative law, Giinter Frankenberg writes:
The comparatist approaches her field of research purely as
philosopher, historian, sociologist or legal scholar; her task is
merely to collect interesting items, to systematize, to develop
or unify the law and/or to bring about rational change. . . .
They call for an objectifying methodological approach or trust
that international collaborations will correct national biases.
They modestly propose rules of comparative reason, that if
every comparatist follows will control subjectivity.20
Rather than look for an introduction to comparative law written
from one's own perspective, so as comfortably to ignore the fact
that we are viewing the phenomenon from only one perspective,
we can benefit from the perspectives of others who react to, and
analyse its functionality. At the same time, one must however re-
main observant of the functionality principle, even while criticiz-
ing it. While functionalism may have problems and faults, the
fact remains that if we want to compare legal traditions, there
must be something we are comparing, and for the comparison to
be worthwhile, the things compared should in some way be justifi-
ably comparable. Some authors like James Gordley would com-
pare black letter law and say civil and common law cultures are
converging. The mixing of systems within the European Union
contributes to this phenomenon. "It is worth noting, however, that
English judgments nowadays, by reason of the incorporation of
Community law and the European Convention of Human Rights
use such abstract concepts [as principles, freedoms and rights]
19. Frankenberg, supra note 5, at 423. In the spirit of the critical legal studies relative,
post-modernism, one can turn this critique back on Frankenberg and note that he too is too
much wed to continental civil law when he says "In order to find, compare and evaluate
these effects, the comparativist has to move back and forth between texts and their applica-
tion." Such a characterization of law omits both customary law and the oral tradition, and
assumes that at its foundation, law is a text.
20. Id. at 424-25, referring to Zweigert and Katz as well as Ernst Rabel's statement "If
the picture presented by a scholar is colored by his background or education, international
collaboration will correct it," in Ernst Rabel, Deutsches und Amerikanisches Recht, 16
Zeitschrift fir Auslandisches und Internationales Privatrecht 359 (1951).
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more than in the past."2 1 But if instead of comparing the black
letter law one compares the mentalities of the practicing lawyers,
as does Pierre Legrand, one might well conclude that there is no
convergence.22
A simple attempt to correct for the bias of assuming one's own
norms to be standard comes to us through formalism. Given that
formalism was a trend in other disciplines at the time, it should
not be a surprise if one might trace a thread of formalist method
in comparative law back to the beginning of the twentieth centu-
ry.23 "Formalism prompts a narrow conception of law that, in a
comparative perspective, is informed by the domestic legal culture
and then projected onto what in other historical or social contexts
is, looks like or may be taken as law."24 In comparative law, for-
malism theorizes law as a "set of rules and principles independent
of other political and social institutions."2 5 An alternative ap-
proach to formalism would be to treat foreign law as a topic of do-
mestic law; that is to say, just another course in a student's do-
mestic curriculum, like taxation or wills and estates, such that he
then uncritically and unreflectively takes what he knows already
of law, and plugs in foreign law as though it were just new rules
within one's own system.
From the formalist roots that often beset the beginning of at-
tempts to systematize or scientize a discipline, comparative law
then drifted into functionalism. Private practitioners who wish to
represent the interests of their clients are likely to use the func-
tionality approach. "Functionality becomes the pivotal methodo-
logical principle determining the choice of laws to compare, the
scope of the undertaking, the creation of a system of comparative
law, and the evaluation of findings."26 Functionalism rejects for-
malism in part and incorporates formalism in part. The great
proponents of functionalism, Konrad Zweigert and Hein Kotz, re-
duce all comparative law method to functionalism: "The basic
methodological principle of all comparative law is that of function-
alism. . . . Incomparables cannot usefully be compared, and in law
the only things which are comparable are those which fulfill the
21. Sir Konrad Schiemann, From Common Law Judge to European Judge,
EUROPAISCHES PRIVATRECHT (ZEuP) HEFr 4, 742 (2005).
22. Reimann, supra note 3, at 690 n.109.
23. Frederick Schauer, Formalism, 97 YALE L.J. 509 passim (1988).
24. Frankenberg, supra note 5, at 422.
25. BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 913 (7th ed. 1999).
26. Frankenberg, supra note 5, at 436.
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same function."27 The great assumption upon which this method
must be based is that "[t]he proposition rests on what every com-
paratist learns, namely that the legal system of every society faces
essentially the same problems and solves these problems by quite
different means though very often with similar results."28
This praesumptio similitudinis (presumption of similarity) is
not without its critics. A weak point in the functionalist method,
including that of Zweigert and Kotz, is that it begins from a pre-
sumption that legal systems of the world are sufficiently similar
such that one can find similar functions among them. As a result
of this presumption, Zweigert and Kotz go so far as to say that if
at the end of research one discovers "diametrically opposite re-
sults, he should be put on notice to go back to check again whether
the terms in which he posed his original question were indeed
purely functional, and whether he has spread the net of his re-
searches quite wide enough."29 With this in mind, analyses can
only be conducted if the questions used are capable of yielding
similarities, regardless of how well those similarities represent the
practices of lawyers in those systems. It would be equally as logi-
cal to begin from the presumption that legal systems are dissimi-
lar enough that no similarities can be found. Both assumptions
put a rabbit in the magician's hat that pre-determines the out-
come of the comparison.
Functionalism seems especially to have an affinity for commer-
cial law. So for example, legal origins scholarship "produced pri-
marily by economists, not legal scholars-has a close affinity with
functionalist comparative law."o Commercial law and some other
areas of the law are less culturally-connected than other areas of
the law.3 1 When the specifics of a culture are not at issue, the
law's norms and forms are more easily transferred to another cul-
ture and may be understood by lawyers in multiple cultures with-
27. ZWEIGERT & KOTZ, supra note 4, at 34.
28. Id. See also, Zweigert, Die Praesumptio Similitudinis als Grundsatzvermutung
rechtsoergleichender Methode, in Inchiesete di Diritto Comparato-Scopi e Metodi di Diritto
Comparato 735 (M. Rotondi ed 1973 as cited by Frankenberg, supra note 5, at 437). Cri-
tiques of this presumption of similarity are found at 3 L. Constantinesco, Rechtsverglei-
chung (1971) at iii, 54-68 and VIVIAN CURRAN, COMPARATIVE LAW: AN INTRODUCTION pas-
sim (Carolina Academic Press, 2002).
29. ZWEIGERT & KOTZ, supra note 4, at 40.
30. Christopher A. Whytock, Legal Origins, Functionalism, and the Future of Compara-
tive Law, BYU L. REV. 1879, 1880 (2009).
31. JAMEs GORDLEY ET AL., AN INTRODUCTION TO THE COMPARATIVE STUDY OF PRIVATE
LAw.
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out so much need for translation or cultural immersion-that is to
say, without a need for focus on comparison.
But other areas of the law are more attached to a culture, such
as constitutional law,32 family law or criminal law," for example.
It is in these areas that we see the points of contention among
U.S. Supreme Court Justices in Mary Ann Glendon's lead article.
These culturally-dependent areas cannot so easily be understood
without a focus on the process of comparison. While the process of
comparison could begin without focus on its process, an uncritical
juxtaposition will, in short order, employ a comparative theory,
such as formalism or functionalism, consciously or unconsciously.
In short, the study of any foreign legal system is not the same pro-
cess as the study of one's own system and that study is vastly im-
proved if one is conscious of the differences of cultural approach
within the foreign legal system before one carries out the compari-
son.
In the one hundred or so years that we have recognized "com-
parative law" as an independent scholarly pursuit, many scholars
have concluded that it has been unfortunately rather unproduc-
tive. A survey of comparative law literature, both among the prac-
tice-oriented authors and among the theory-oriented authors
makes two things rather clear from their perspective: first, there
is no agreed-upon set ofpractices or concepts by which one can
denote "comparative law," and second, because of the failure to
agree on the category, no method or theoretical framework seems
to be happening that would enable would-be researchers or practi-
tioners to build a discipline.3 4 Mathias Reimann and others have
noted the increased interest in comparative law in Europe as part
of the Europeanization process of the Single European Act, the
Maastricht Treaty and the Lisbon Treaty, but they have also cau-
tioned that the process is concerned largely only with black letter
law, viewed positivistically, and advancing private interests. "As
32. See, e.g., DORSEN ET AL., COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONALISM, CASES AND MATERIALS
and JACKSON AND TUSHNET, COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW.
33. Discussions with practicing professional German lawyers who have obtained their
masters degrees in law (usually the LLM degree) have indicated that they chose their cur-
ricula based upon cultural interest-hence family law and criminal law-and not just prac-
tical, commercial interest. After all, is legal education not intended to be a complete educa-
tion, not just formal training, Bildung and not just Ausbildung, in the words of Alexander
von Humboldt?
34. Indeed, researchers in the field cannot even agree whether to call themselves "com-
parativists" or "comparatists."
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a result, there is no better theoretical framework in Europe than
there is in the United States."35
C. Critiques of the Orthodoxies
Much comparative private law has been written using the func-
tionalist method and it continues to garner quite a following. A
considerable amount has also been written as critique of the func-
tionalist method. Criticism comes from several directions against
functionalism. A first critique for consideration was launched al-
ready back in 1922, long before functionalism was named and in-
troduced. Then, Pierre Lepaulle made a strong case that compari-
sons are misleading when restricted to one legal phenomenon, ob-
serving that: "A legal system is a unity, the whole of which ex-
presses itself in each part; the same blood runs in the whole or-
ganism. Hence each part must necessarily be seen in its relation
to the whole."36
Some of the criticism of functionalism comes from critical legal
studies. The now-famous text by Zweigert and Kotz provides a
replicable method of functionalism which one might employ as a
social scientific tool to achieve respectable comparisons. Social
unrest in much of the world in the 1960s eventually made its way
to comparative law as well. Through tte 1980s and 1990s, com-
parativists in the critical legal studies movement in the United
States were applying social thinking and post-modern theory to
the law with the expressed aim of including marginalized and re-
pressed persons' legal cultures among those to be compared, all
the while questioning the orthodoxies that supported a notion of
comparative law that one might easily describe as contributing to
globalization.3 7 I will review some of the critiques made by Gunter
Frankenberg, Mathias Reimann, and Vivian Curran as just a
sample here.
The problem of bias grew into allegations of ethnocentrism by
proponents of critical legal studies. Gunter Frankenberg offers as
a corrective that:
35. Reimann, supra note 3, at 694.
36. Lepaulle, supra note 11, at 853.
37. See Udo Mattei, Comparative Law and Critical Legal Studies, in THE OXFORD
HANDBOOK OF COMPARATIVE LAw 815 (Mathias Reimann and Reinhard Zimmerman
eds,. Oxford University Press 2006).
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To cope with ethnocentrism we have to analyze and unravel
the cultural ties that bind us to the domestic legal regime. A
practical and rather fascinating beginning could be a deviant
reading of comparative legal literature focusing on the mar-
ginal stuff that is normally skipped for lack of relevance.
Forewords and prefaces have iterating stories to tell about
how comparison, despite higher aims and claims, is inspired
and organized, in part at least, by contingent factors that re-
veal perspective: the comparativist's legal education and ex-
posure to specific legal cultures honeymoons and travels, invi-
tations to conferences, and so on. The marginal remarks indi-
cate why and how the purportedly objective discovery and
comparisons of the 'compared' legal culture is undercut by the
comparativist's assumptions.38
Where might one see evidence of ethnocentrism in functionality?
If we apply an important lesson from comparative law itself to
Zweigert and Kdtz, we can legitimately examine the perspective
from which they see the discipline of comparative law. Part II of
their Introduction to Comparative Law is divided into contracts,
unjust enrichment and torts.3 9 Most German readers will readily
recognize these divisions as being borrowed directly from the
German Civil Code, the Bilrgerliches Gesetzbuch. Why, for exam-
ple, is a newer area of the law, such as environmental law not in-
cluded?4 0 Thus, in attempting to provide a science and a method
for comparative law that is above or beyond any one system, even
the powerful work of Zweigert and Kotz demonstrates that it is
impossible to compare without having a point of perspective from
which one compares. One cannot step out of the hermeneutic cir-
cle, but rather can at best become conscious that one is in the cir-
cle, that one sees the world from his place in the circle, and that
one tries to make observations of other things in the circle know-
ing that his is only one perspective." Thus a common law lawyer
writing on comparativism might need to invite a civil law lawyer
to present the picture from civil law, and vice versa.
38. Frankenberg, supra note 5, at 443 (citation omitted).
39. ZWEIGERT & KOTz, supra note 4, pt. 2. .
40. See, e.g., NICHOLAS ROBINSON ET AL., COMPARATIVE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW (2d ed.
2012).
41. See generally RAINER HEGENBARTH, JURISTISCHE HERMENEUTIK UND
LINGUISTISCHE PRAGMATIK (Athenaum 1982).
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By the new century, comparative law might well have reached a
new era. Mathias Reimann avers that "comparative law has
moved way beyond . . . relatively rudimentary models in at least
three regards."42 First, according to Reimann, we now understand
that all classifications are only approximations of reality; second,
we have now learned to think of legal systems as legal traditions
and not as static and isolated entities; and third, "we have devel-
oped at least some understanding of the interactions between
these legal families, traditions, and cultures."43 While functional-
ism has come under criticism-much of it justified-a single, new
ship sailing forward upon which to fly the flag of comparativism
has yet to emerge. The critical legal studies movement criticized
functionalism heavily, but has not put forward an agreed-upon
replacement.
Regardless of whether comparative law is conducted as a schol-
arly pursuit or a practical pursuit, it is often practiced as though
from the perspective of the disinterested neutral observer, who is
objectively and evenly studying several legal systems, their histo-
ries, pieces of their practices or their sources of law. There are
several well-founded critiques of such an approach to comparative
law. First, one can see that "[iin the end the neutral observer re-
veals herself as a lawyer in defense of the status quo."44 Further,
"the comparativist's own 'system' is never left behind or critically
exposed to the light of the new. . . . The comparativist travels stra-
tegically, always returning to the ever present and idealized home
system."45 That said, much of comparative law since World War II
has been conducted in North America or Europe. Consequently,
the successes of comparative law in the latter half of the twentieth
century can largely be characterized as a tool for the "Europeani-
zation of private law."46 While new forays in comparative law
may be happening recently in Asia, "Latin America continues to
be understudied and Africa is almost ignored"4 7 even by such flag-
ship comparative law journals as the American Journal of Com-
42. Reimann, supra note 3, at 676.
43. Id. at 677-78 (emphasis added).
44. Frankenberg, supra note 5, at 440.
45. Id. at 433.
46. Mathias Reimann, supra note 3, at 673.
47. Id. at 674.
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parative Law." And public law does not often get as much ink
even within Europe as Asia, Latin America and Africa.
To answer the question of why there has not been work in public
or criminal law, it is worth looking at "The Treaty of Lisbon: an
impact assessment, 10th report of session 2007-08,"49 published by
the European Union Committee of the British House of Lords. In
the report, the authors stated that "[olne problem we have is that
little is known about continental systems of criminal justice. It is
an area that has hardly ever been studied. There are no universi-
ty chairs of comparative law that specialize in comparative crimi-
nal procedure, anywhere in the British Isles.""
Vivian Curran not only offers a critique of functionality, she also
offers an alternative. She points out that in relying upon func-
tionality, they assume away the object of inquiry." The question
"Is there a similar function?" is not asked, according to Curran,
but rather it is assumed there is, and the method launches itself
from this assumption into determining what function is in opera-
tion. More importantly, she says Zweigert and Kotz are assuming
that it is possible to carry out the old goal of comparative law-to
distill a global, common, and unified system of private law-and to
do so, they begin by assuming they will find similarities. This cri-
tique is like that of the old-time magician, who claims to be able to
pull a rabbit from his hat, only because he knows he has already
put the rabbit in the hat.
If one is attempting something like an objective or neutral sci-
ence of comparison, it is indeed peculiar to advocate beginning
from a perspective that is admittedly biased toward finding simi-
larities, just as it would be to acknowledge and employ a bias in
search of differences. Yet there does not seem to be much reflec-
tion on the quick abandoning by many comparativists of both the
attempt at a neutral scientific vantage point of observation and an
exploration of the biases of their own vantage point.
Curran's critique is related to a more general critique based up-
on the "identity-difference principle." In the identity-difference
48. One count of articles published from 1952-1997 of that journal contained 41.12%
about Europe, 8.6% about Asia and only 1.79% about Africa, see Upham, The Place of Jap-
anese Studies in American Comparative Law, 1997 UTAH L. REV. 639, 641 (1997), in
Reimann, supra note 3, at 674 n.12.
49. HOUSE OF LORDS, EUROPEAN UNION COMMITTEE, THE TREATY OF LISBON: AN
IMPACT ASSESSMENT, 10TH REPORT OF SESSION 2007-08, 2008, London: Stationary Office, at
E-131 (2008).
50. Id.
51. CURRAN, supra note 28.
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principle, it is said that for any two phenomena, one can of course
find one basic similarity (they exist, they are both made of mole-
cules and so on), and also at least one difference (even two pencils,
mass-produced and side-by-side, do not exist in the same physical
space, for example). 52 Curran's preferred alternative mode of com-
parison is through immersion in the new legal culture.53
Much of the work in comparative law compares civil law prob-
lems and solutions with common law problems and solutions.
Here too, a type of legal ethnocentric bias is possible. Civilists,
due to the structure of civil legal systems might assume that all of
law must be capable of a grand, unifying system not because com-
parative law must be able to make that possible, but because civil
law behaves that way. As a result, civilists might conclude that
"Only the Continental systems, with their tendency to abstraction
and generalization, develop the grand comprehensive concepts,
while the common law, with its inductive and case-by-case habits,
produces low-level legal institutions especially adapted to solve
isolated, concrete problems."54
Even at the height of critical legal studies, and after a long and
convincing expos6 of the weaknesses of comparative law in prac-
tice, Giinter Frankenberg concluded that:
To abandon comparative legal studies would be wrong-
headed, I think, for it would freeze the tradition and current
conditions into an eternal pattern. It would be equally wrong
to go on with a comparative muddling-through. And from
reading through the various approaches and from such high-
lights as Pound's Comparative Law in Time and Space, I infer
that it is not just a more complex and longer process of com-
parison that is needed. Comparative law never had too little
baggage in the overhead compartment. To this very day it is
crammed with thoughts and oughts, with aims and claims.
52. Here one must be careful not to engage in the sophomoric practice of "compare and
contrast," as a substitute for comparative method. Simple juxtaposition is not the compar-
ative method. I am reminded of a colleague who once observed that most papers presented
at academic conferences could be boiled down to one of two themes: "X and Xa may appear
to be similar, but I will show you how they are really different," or "X and Xa may appear to
be different, but I will show you how they are really the same."
53. CURRAN, supra note 28.
54. Frankenberg, supra note 5, at 440.
55. Id., at 441.
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Curran's work guides things in the direction of addressing the
language questions of comparative law, and away from pure dis-
cussions of method or ideology. There are other current perspec-
tives of course that adhere to neither functionalism nor critical
legal studies thinking, like that of Bernhard Grossfeld. Grossfeld
not only offers his own method, but presents a critique of orthodox
comparison method, while addressing the core questions." In
Grossfeld's critique, he unequivocally states that "[tio give order to
connections and to render them comprehensible also is the schol-
arly duty of comparative law."" He says that "we should not take
the functional method too narrowly."" He goes on to write that
comparison in the mode of translation not only has all the ad-
vantages of immersion over functionalism, but also has the added
advantage of being more easily executed by the comparativist."9
Bernhard Grossfeld instead mobilizes translation as method for
comparative law.o But he means more than an analogy. Whereas
I made the analogy above to comparative law as translation,
Grossfeld would say, for example, that Eastern law, like picto-
grams, is not comprised of language, but is instead right brain
thinking and therefore not comparable to other legal systems in
which law is language-based." Elsewhere, Grossfeld notes that
law:
[A]rises much the way language does, as was so clearly point-
ed out by Friedrich Karl Savigny, who stated early in his clas-
sic work: In the earliest times to which authentic history ex-
tends, the law will be found to have already attained a fixed
character, peculiar to the people, like their language, manners
and constitution. Nay, these phenomena have no separate ex-
istence, they are but the particular faculties and tendencies of
an individual people, inseparably united in nature, and only
wearing the semblance of distinct attributes to our view.
That which binds them into one whole is the common convic-
tion of the people, the kindred consciousness of an inward ne-
56. See GROSSFELD, supra note 7.
57. Id. at 93.
58. Id. at 7.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 89-104.
61. Jack A. Hiller & Bernhard Grossfeld, Comparative Legal Semiotics and the Divided
Brain: Are We Producing Half Brained Lawyers? 50 AM J. COMP. L. 175 passim (2002).
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cessity, excluding all notion of an accidental and arbitrary
origin. 2
Bernhard Grossfeld seems to allow the praesumptio similitudi-
nis, but then offers both a critique of functionalism and an alter-
native that he builds through language study. Insofar as he al-
lows for the praesumptio similitudinis, one could level that same
critique against Grossfeld, who posits that comparative law should
be focused not on the differences, but on the perceived commonali-
ties: "They form intercultural 'bridges,' enabling agreement
across borders. If we total up the differences, we distort the pic-
ture. Comparative law first and foremost must be 'bridge seeking'
and 'bridge building.'"63 The "must" in that statement is of course
a matter of choice.
He tells us to remember the process of learning any second lan-
guage. It was mechanical-one learns the structure of grammar
and then inserts as much vocabulary as one can memorize. That
is not how we learn our native language. In addition, when learn-
ing languages after the mother language is learned, we do so by
comparison to our own first language. But beyond my analogy in
which learning another legal system is like learning another lan-
guage, Grossfeld maintains that learning another legal system is
learning another language, for we accomplish this practice of com-
parison by creating-not finding-relationships that we say are
equal. In the same way that we cannot learn a second language as
we learned our mother tongue (with the exception of course of
those who have learned a second language at early age and are
truly bilingual), we must at least become conscious of these reali-
ties of learning by translation, and not fool ourselves into believ-
ing that we can learn another culture, even a legal culture, simply
by reading the same texts that a native reads.
By seeing the act of comparison as an act of translation,
"[ciomparative law goes beyond textual comparison into order and
relationship comparison."' According to Grossfeld, "the reading of
a foreign legal text often gives us a false picture. . . . In order to
avoid this, we need to recognize the context of the text. Yet we are
62. Jack A. Hiller & Bernhard Grossfeld, Comparative Legal Semiotics and the Divided
Brain: Are We Producing Half-Brained Lawyers?, 50 AM J. COMP. L. 175, 178-79 (2002)
(quoting FRIEDRICH CARL VON SAVIGNY, OF THE VOCATION OF OUR AGE FOR LEGISLATION
AND JURISPRUDENCE 24 (1814) (A. Hayward transl., 1975)) (internal quotation marks omit-
ted).
63. GROSSFELD, supra note 7, at 12.
64. Id. at 125.
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not able to observe foreign contexts in an unbiased way, for each
system responds to observation, observes itself."" Grossfeld con-
nects the science of comparativism to the natural sciences when
he cites physicist Werner Heisenberg: "the connection between
two different closed conceptual systems always must be a very
painstaking analysis."" Grossfeld observes that "comparative law
"is not for 'clever boys' or 'clever girls.' It requires patience and
the capacity to empathize." Elsewhere he adds: "Only rarely
does one read anything about the execution [of law] in practice.
We remain thus always at risk of taking the representation for
life, and dead law for living law."
Like natural languages, we all begin our lives doing everyday
things within our own legal system. We typically spend years in
that system, accumulating knowledge of it in the same way as
other laypersons before we ever begin to study it scientifically or
professionally. Thus the categories in our mind called 'language'
or 'legal system' are in fact biased by the fact that we have
learned our language and our legal system, not some neutral cate-
gory called 'language' or 'legal system,' and we thus learn any
second language or legal system by translating it into our own.
This is not a disastrous state of affairs, so long as we remain con-
scious of it. But if we assume that our legal system is in some way
the legal system, with some sort of natural or objective connection
to the world, then we have made the same error as if we had as-
sumed the same about our spoken language.
Grossfeld begins the final chapter of his work with a discussion
of method:
We have dealt with some basic problems of comparative
law; we found ways to approach them, but we did not find
sure answers: Great tasks lie ahead for comparative law; it
must let itself be challenged if it wants to win the future in a
world that is not European in imprint. A technical-functional
comparison without a study of national customs, without cul-
tural-research and without loving empathy (Bernhard von
Clairvaux . . .: Res tantum intelligetur quantum amatur (a
matter is understood to the extent that it is loved)) remains a
65. Id. at 90-91.
66. WERNER HEISENBERG, PHYSIK UND PHILOSOPHIE 77 (1984) as quoted by
GROSSFELD, supra note 7, at 110.
67. GROSSFELD, supra note 7, at 110.
68. Id. at 91.
Winter 2014 89
Duquesne Law Review
study of words, letters and numbers, touches only the superfi-
cial level and leads into error."
Grossfeld's disquisition on what he calls the core questions of
comparative law are the closest that one comes to a focus, or re-
focus on issues of the act of comparison, rather than a focus on the
laws themselves or ideological problems. This focus on compari-
son leads me to offer one of my own.
II. RHETORIC AND LAW
Lawyers know law. Lawyers are trained in law according to the
particular structures and institutions of the society in which they
are trained. Formalism and functionalism focused upon sources of
law. Critical legal studies insisted that the social and cultural
ideologies of the source state and the target state (to borrow terms
from translation studies) must be part of the comparison. While
the critical legal studies lesson is of course culturally valuable and
fair, it threw the sense of unity that functionalism had accom-
plished back into a situation of multivariance, which unsurpris-
ingly makes it difficult for scholars to feel there is a single, unified
science that builds on this work. Rather than look for a unifying
theory of law through which to achieve a sense of building, I sug-
gest we focus on the act of comparison itself.
Mathias Reimann, after surveying comparative law literature,
concluded that "The problem is that these books, articles, ideas,
and critiques do not add up to a sum that is larger than its parts.
Instead, they constitute a potpourri of disparate elements that
coexist side-by-side but rarely relate to any overarching themes."o
It is my contention that the lack of unity to which Reimann and
others allude in the development of comparative law is due to fo-
cusing on the laws, instead of comparison itself. Even those rela-
tively few scholars who have attempted to focus on comparison,
have typically done so without reference to a solid disciplinary
foundation for comparison. To improve upon the discipline, I
would therefore put forward an established foundation to facilitate
the task of comparison that is thoroughly related to civil, ecclesi-
astical and common law. A thorough and considered reflection on
the act of comparison in human thought has been available to
Western culture since the fourth century B. C. Comparison may
69. Id. at 245.
70. Reimann, supra note 3, at 686.
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well have been discussed earlier and elsewhere, but it comes to us
best preserved through Aristotle in his work, Rhetoric. In an age
in which we have scientized all that we think about human think-
ing, one might question why we should bother with pre-
Enlightenment liberal arts when trying to understand compari-
son. The mere fact that comparison is explicitly considered at all
by Aristotle, the most-cited author of all time," over an entire
chapter of his work, ought to be reason enough to consider the im-
pact of what he has to say about comparison. But more to the
point of comparative law, it was the discipline of rhetoric up to,
and through the medieval trivium, that was a basic part of the
education of civil, ecclesiastical and common law lawyers. I will
first address the connections of the discipline of rhetoric to law,
then return to the specific treatment of comparison within the dis-
cipline of rhetoric.
A lesson learned from the study of comparison is that although
focus upon, and critiques of presumptions of similarity or differ-
ence are capable of locating material to compare, they are just the
beginning of the comparison process. Most comparison is made
difficult precisely because there are both differences and similari-
ties between any phenomena under examination, and so much
more focus needs to be placed upon the "degrees" of difference and
similarity, as Aristotle called them. As Mary Ann Glendon notes
in the lead article to this volume, "After all, most cases that reach
the Supreme Court involve choices between positions that are
supported by weighty moral and legal arguments, and the Court
more often than not must make choices that, either way, will en-
tail substantial individual or social cost."72 In other words, all the
discussion about whether to proceed from the presumption of simi-
larity or difference is misleading. Most, if not all cases are both
similar and different by matters of degree, and the choices must
be made on grounds beyond simple categorical similarities or dif-
ferences. In the fourth century B. C., Aristotle had already writ-
71. RICHARD F. HAMILTON, THE SOCIAL MISCONSTRUCTION OF REALITY: VALIDITY AND
VERIFICATION IN THE SCHOLARLY COMMUNITY 277 n.38 (1996) citing Eugene Garfield's
studies in the 1970s and 1980s of nearly a million citations in the Arts and Humanities
Citation Index. Garfield did count more citations to Marx in one study, but added that half
of those citations were limited to philosophy journals and nearly two-thirds of those come
from one journal Deutsche Zeitschrift fir Philosophie. Aristotle's work can be said to have
formed the basis of Jewish, Christian and Muslim Medieval philosophy, according to Robin
Smith, Aristotle's Logic, STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY (Mar. 23, 2011),
http://plato.stanford.edulentries/Aristotle-logic.
72. Mary Ann Glendon, Law in the Age of Globalization, 52 DUQ. L. REV. 11 (2014).
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ten on comparison. In Book I, chapter 7 of his Rhetoric, he focused
on comparison by the degree to which things were comparable.
After "determining the sources from which we must derive our
means of persuasion about good and utility,"73 Aristotle writes
that "[slince however it often happens that people agree that two
things are but useful but do not agree about which is the more so,
the next step . . . will be to treat of relative goodness and relative
utility."74
Aristotle's discussion of making comparisons by degree then
runs through seven exercises. First, a greater number of things
can be considered more desirable than a smaller number of the
same things. Second, that which is an end is a greater good than
that which is only a means. Third, that is scarce is greater than
that which is abundant. Fourth, what a person of practical wis-
dom would choose is a greater good than what an ignorant person
would choose. Fifth, what the majority of people would choose is
better than what the minority would choose. Sixth, what people
would really like to possess is a greater good than what people
would merely like to give the impression of possessing. Seventh, if
a thing does not exist where it is more likely to exist, it will not
exist were it is less likely to exist." Since the Enlightenment, we
have tended to want to quantify degrees of difference and make
our choices based upon numbers. That too might be helpful, but
not all differences and similarities of degree are quantifiable, so
we are still left with the task of choosing when qualities differ.
One may well ask whether these conceptions of comparison have
ever been applied directly to law. There are strong implications
that it has.
The relationship to law comes about because\at the beginning of
what we now know as both the university and the common law,
rhetoric featured heavily in all upper-level education. The curric-
ulum in Bologna and at Oxford that same century would have
consisted of the liberal arts, beginning with the trivium of rheto-
ric, logic and grammar." These three subjects were the most im-
73. ARISTOTLE, Rhetoric, in THE COMPLETE WORKS OF ARISTOTLE I.6.1363bb3-4 (W.
Rhys Roberts, trans., Jonathan Barnes, ed., The Revised Oxford Translation, 1985).
74. Id. at I.7.1363b5.
75. See EDWARD P.J.CORBE IT & ROBERT J. CONNORS, CLASSICAL RHETORIC FOR THE
MODERN STUDENT 97-99 (4th ed. 1999).
76. See H. RASHDALL, THE UNIVERSITIES OF EUROPE IN THE MIDDLE AGES (3 Volumes,
F.M. Powicke, A.B. Emden eds., 2nd ed. 1936).
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portant of the seven liberal arts for medieval students." If a stu-
dent wished to continue, then he could study the arts of harmon-
ics, geometry, arithmetic and astronomy." Furthermore, Irnerius
himself had already been teaching rhetoric at Bologna when he
went to Rome and returned to Bologna, bringing his idea of teach-
ing jurisprudence, and founding the first civil law school of juris-
prudence in 1084."
In the eleventh and twelfth centuries, European jurists revived
Roman law that had not been practiced for centuries. Their meth-
ods were similar to what theologians of the time were using to sys-
tematize and harmonize the Old Testament, the New Testament,
the texts of church fathers and other sacred writings. Important-
ly, these jurists "took as a starting point the concept of a legal con-
cept and the principle that the law is principled.""0 Furthermore,
"[t]he conceptualization of general legal terms, like the formula-
tion of general principles underlying the legal rules, was closely
related not only to the revived interest in Greek philosophy but
also to developments in theology. . . ."8I And they practiced com-
parativism in constructing the general legal principles. Not only
did they practice comparativism, it was the heart of their newly-
established legal science.
There were connections between the developments in evidence,
namely the proof of facts in court, with the study of rhetoric itself.
Today, one often disparages the word "rhetoric" by calling it
"mere," "only," or "just" rhetoric, thus limiting reference to the
connotation of empty speech. But at that time, rhetoric still re-
ferred to the Aristotelian connotation of persuasion by appeal to
reason. With the twelfth century, the historical record reveals
that increasing emphasis was placed on method, including the
method of proof. "The concept of the hypothesis was put forward
by the rhetoricians to supplement the dialectical concept of the
thesis (quaestio). Proof of hypotheses was understood to require
the presentation of evidence, which in turn implied the notion of
probable truth."82
77. R.S. RAIT, LIFE IN THE MEDIEVAL UNIVERSITY 138 (1912).
78. Id.; see also 1 G. LEFF & J. NORTH, A HISTORY OF THE UNIVERSITY IN EUROPE:
UNIVERSITIES IN THE MIDDLE AGES, (W. Ruegg, ed., 1992).
79. Michael Ott, Irnerius in THE CATHOLIC ENCYCLOPEDIA. (Vol. 8. New York: Robert
Appleton Company 1910), available at http://www.newadvent.org/cathen/08168a.htm (last
visited October 3, 2013).
80. BERMAN, supra note 1, at 150.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 154.
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Thus it was with the realities of presenting real evidence, not
theoretical propositions, courts and rhetoricians alike were faced
with uncertainties. Presumptions took on the importance of logic.
Rules of evidence had to be established. "The parallels with law
were stressed: A well-known treatise of the twelfth century, Rhe-
torica Ecclesiastica, stated that 'both rhetoric and law have a
common procedure.' The same treatise defined a case (causa) as a
'civil dispute concerning a certain statement or a certain act of a
certain person."'83 Here one can see the development of a legal
case in much the same way that the concept of an hypothesis had
been developed in rhetoric. The Rhetorica Ecclesiastica addition-
ally asserted that to find the truth of a disputed matter a judge, a
witness, an accuser, and a defender were all required. Rules of
relevancy and materiality were developed and by the early thir-
teenth century exclusionary rules had been developed.' "Ales-
sandro Giulani has shown that this system of 'artificial reason' of
the law was discarded in most countries of Europe after the end of
the fifteenth century and replaced by 'natural reason,' which em-
phasized mathematical logic.""s But, most important for we com-
mon law lawyers is that Giulani's work also shows that despite
the Enlightenment impact of Thomas Hobbes and others in Eng-
land, in English common law, the system of so-called "artificial
reason" survived through the efforts of Edward Coke, Mathew
Hale, and their successors.""
The connection of rhetoric to the medieval study of civil law is
not the entire picture, however. As we know, the medieval com-
mon law lawyer was not educated at the universities of Oxford,
Cambridge or London, but rather at the inns of court. Therefore,
in order to be able to make the claim that the medieval lawyer was
educated in rhetoric, one cannot just assume so as a result of uni-
versity education. "A realistic point in time to begin a discussion
of Anglo-American legal history, then, is with the common law as
it stood when it first became the object of study by a distinct legal
83. "Causa est civilis disceptatio de certo dicto vel facto certae personae," as quoted in
BERMAN, supra note 1, at 154. (citing Alessandro Giulani, The Influence of Rhetoric on the
Law of Evidence and Pleading, JuDIciAL REV., 62, 231 (1969)).
84. BERMAN, supra note 1, at 155, again referring to Giulani, supra note 83, at 234-35.
Berman comments further in the note that "These rules of relevance were applied first to
the propositions (positions) to which parties and witnesses swore oaths and later to the
allegations (articuli), proved through witnesses and documents, which gradually replaced
the older form as oaths were devalued."
85. BERMAN, supra note 1, at 154-55 (citing Giulani, supra note 83, at 237).
86. Id.
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profession . . . ."" One could best say that the practice of law be-
came an exclusive profession by edict of Edward I. I am persuad-
ed by the legal historian Kempin when he offers that:
Perhaps the crucial event in the beginning of the legal pro-
fession was an edict issued in 1292 by Edward I. At that time
what passed for a profession was in a sorry state. Legal busi-
ness had increased tremendously; yet there were no schools of
the common law, and the universities considered law too vul-
gar a subject for scholarly investigation. Edward's order di-
rected Common Pleas to choose certain 'attorneys and learn-
ers' who alone would be allowed to follow the court and to
take part in court business . . .. The effect of putting the ed-
ucation of lawyers into the hands of the court cannot be over-
estimated. It resulted in the relative isolation of English law-
yers from Continental, Roman, and ecclesiastical influence."
But did it result in them not being trained in rhetoric? And if not,
did they then not have the training and experience of understand-
ing the role of comparison as a commonplace? The university sys-
tem may seem remote from the inns of court and chancery at first
glance. "It would have been strange, however, if the educational
notions of Paris, Oxford and Cambridge, which were taken for
granted in university circles, had no influence in London. And we
believe that in truth the obvious differences are outweighed by
obvious similarities."" Given what we know of the medieval edu-
cation in the trivium, we can therefore go one step further and
assumeo the similarities would have included an exposure to
rhetoric for the students of the inns.
While I take it as undeniable that the education, language, pro-
cedure and norms of the English legal system greatly influenced
the American legal system, it remains for me to make explicit that
would include English legal education, such as it was in the early
days, regardless of whether we can find explicit one-to-one bridges
to American usage. The study of rhetoric often presupposes that a
87. Kempin, supra note 8, at 3.
88. Id. at 79.
89. J. H BAKER, THE LEGAL PROFESSION AND THE COMMON LAW 9 (1986).
90. We are forced to make assumptions because the first record of the inns is not until
1388, do we have a written record of the goings-on at the inns, as Baker indicates. Prior to
that, "The most we can say with confidence is that the town-houses where the apprentices
of the Bench lived in term-time had acquired by the 1350s educational as well as purely
residential functions, and the inns had thereby become societies." Id. at 3.
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speaker, such as a student, is in need of help in composing a
speech, while law will assume the material that might be under
discussion is extant and already known and available for compari-
son. Thus, "both Cicero and Quintilian maintained that the most
valuable background for an orator was a liberal education because
they recognized that such a broad education was best calculated to
aid a person faced with the necessity of inventing arguments on a
wide variety of subjects."" With centuries of recorded experience
and observation behind them, the rhetoricians noticed that for a
given culture, reflection, education and reading would lead to
"'places' where certain categories of arguments resided."92 Rheto-
ric is cognizant that this social phenomenon is subject to change
over time and place, but when one properly observes where these
places are here and now, his or her argument will have greater
resonance with the audience of that time and place. The system
by which one can know these places is the topics. "The rhetori-
cians saw, for instance, that one of the tendencies of the human
mind is to seek out the nature of things."9 3 So they identified "def-
inition" as a topic.
"Another tendency of the human mind is to compare things and
when things are compared, one discovers similarities or differ-
ence-and the differences will be in kind or degree."94 In this sim-
ple exercise, the rhetoricians see that one must first know his
purpose in order to determine if it presents an opportunity for def-
inition or comparison. Thus, consistent with the orthodoxy of
Zweigert and Kotz, one must ask why one is comparing, rather
than assume that comparison is natural, normal or inevitable. As
Quintilian said, "it is no use considering each separate type of ar-
gument and knocking at the door of each with a view to discover-
ing whether they may chance to serve to prove our point, except
while we are in the position of mere learners."" According to Ed-
ward Corbett, "Quintilian envisioned a time when, as the result of
study and practice, students would acquire that "innate penetra-
tion" and "power of rapid divination" which would lead them di-
rectly to those arguments suited to their particular case.""
91. CORBETI' & CONNORS, supra note 75, at 85.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 86.
94. Id.
95. V QUINTILIAN, INSTITUTIO ORATORIA x, 122 (Harold Edgeworth Butler trans. Har-
vard University Press 1921), as quoted by CORBET'T & CONNORS, supra note 91, at 86.
96. Id. at 86.
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Insofar as the students' powers, as described by Quintilian, en-
abled them to read different cultures differently in different places
and times, the question for law becomes whether now, in an era
known as globalization, is the time for comparison in looking for
legal solutions to social problems? My question takes the lessons
of rhetoric for the student seeking to write a speech and applies
them to a lawyer in search of solutions for his client and the legal
scholar in search of system wide solutions for his systematic legal
problems.
III. THE Focus ON COMPARISON APPLIED
In his assessment of the style of writing judicial opinions, Sir
Konrad Schiemann, a judge on the European Court of Justice
(ECJ), and formerly a judge of the High Court in England, made a
subtle but scientifically important conclusion. Throughout a short
article, he compared writing judgments in England to those of the
ECJ, using the criterion of style in his explorations and explana-
tions. In the end, however, his comparison made a conclusion
based not only upon style as an isolated criterion, but upon social
purpose relative to the stated purpose of the court. And from that
assessment, he concluded that: "the ECJ's practices have the ad-
vantage over English practices-at any event for the task that this
court has to fulfill. I have the feeling that there is a genuine at-
tempt to arrive at the best common solution that the brains of the
court can reach."'
In her review of the three U.S. Supreme Court cases of Roper v.
Simmons," Lawrence v. Texas," Washington v. Glucksberg, oo Pro-
fessor Glendon lays out the disparate positions of Justices Breyer
and Scalia.101 She notes that the debate seems to be about the
propriety of foreign norms in American culture, but in practice
might have much more to do with the balance of power between
courts-especially the U.S. Supreme Court-and the state legisla-
tures. She points out that Justice Breyer ought to have noticed
that the foreign norms were legislated, not opined by the courts,
and that that difference mattered when it came to implementation
or the "starting point," as Justice Breyer calls it, of foreign
97. Schiemann, supra note 21, at 741- 49, 747.
98. 543 U.S. 51 (2005).
99. 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
100. 521 U.S. 702 (1997).
101. See Glendon, supra note 72.
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norms. She further cautions that foreign law should be used with
attention to detail of its own particulars, rather than transpose
assumptions from one's own particular system. That is of course a
solid critique. We might go further.
Many other jurisdictions in the world now have a separate con-
stitutional court, although unlike the United States, the names
and reputations of the individual judges on those courts remains
largely unknown. But more importantly, the majority of the
world's jurisdictions are based on the civil law tradition. I would
not bother to trot out the mechanics of stare decisis and say that is
of utmost importance here. There is something I regard as less
mechanical, but more powerful. The citizens of civil law jurisdic-
tions do not expect authoritative interpretations of legislation
from their judges. When they seek it at all, they seek it from
scholars in the field. So just as Justice Breyer ought to have no-
ticed that foreign countries' norms on juvenile death penalties or
homosexual acts are legislatively-determined, it should also be
noted that they are most often legislatively-determined in civil law
countries where no one would expect explication of norms by
courts anyway.
Judge Schiemann's surprising article on judicial style suggests
something further to be said about the judicial opinion as a forum
in which a common law judge may expound on legal theory in
ways that legislators cannot. Legislators may make records of
deliberations in various jurisdictions of the world, just as the U.S.
Congress does with the Congressional Record, but those records
are not law. The common law judicial opinion, however, is law.
IV. CONCLUSION
The problem (or "exigency" as rhetors would call it) that I have
attempted to address is the lack of focus on comparison in the
study and practice of comparative law. This problem has become
more severe with each increment of unreflective globalization, in-
cluding in our legal practices. Treating comparison as a common
topic helps us to minimize the rabbit-in-the-hat searches for simi-
larities and differences, within and apart from functionalism, and
focus instead on comparisons by degree. Looking at the cases pro-
vided by Mary Ann Glendon in this volume, not only might we
conclude that Justice Breyer missed the fact that the other juris-
dictions accomplished the norms in question through the legisla-
ture, but by applying the distinction of degrees from Aristotle, we
would also see that other jurisdictions accomplished their distinc-
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tions with a public that does not expect judges to make or inter-
pret norms. And legislatures do not and cannot include their legal
theories and rationale within the legislation itself. The disciplined
study of problems and solutions to comparisons by degree have
been available for millennia. Globalism is an exigency that war-
rants the focus of law upon comparison.

